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PUBLIC DIPLOMACY AND ITS CURRENT PRACTICE

Similarly to classic or traditional diplomacy, it is very difficult to state unambiguously what exactly public diplomacy is as the term has so many definitions and attributed connotations. In order to put it “diplomatically”, terminological chaos in the case of this notion seems to reign supreme. Scholars unanimously state that it undoubtedly is an extremely important tool in foreign policy, which allows for shaping public opinion favorably in other countries and, by extension, indirectly, also the governments of those countries, but at the same time, they offer a multitude of ways how to understand what public diplomacy is or should be. If diplomacy is understood as the external activities of state authorities, whose aim is realization of foreign policy, it only follows that the methods applied in foreign policy and people employed in the foreign service must be closely linked to the goals.¹ Undoubtedly, public diplomacy must have sprung from traditional diplomacy, but the accents seem to be somewhat different. According to Nancy Snow,² a change in emphasis – from traditional (state) diplomacy to the public sphere – results from different tools employed and different targeted groups, although its main aim remains the same to provide support for traditional diplomacy. In opposition to traditional diplomacy, public diplomacy is transparent and societal, and the more so, the better. The latter may be conducted both by the governments and non-governmental entities, and the target groups may be a broad spectrum of people as well as narrowly select groups.³

Public diplomacy is – or often tends to be – associated with propaganda, international PR,⁴ public affairs,⁵ soft power or simply a psychological war. Eytan Gibo⁶

¹ See: J. Sutor, *Prawo dyplomatyczne i konsularne*, Warsaw 2000, p. 29.

² N. Snow, *Rethinking Public Diplomacy*, [in:] *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*, eds. N. Snow, P.M. Taylor, New York 2009, p. 6.

³ A. Ziętek, *Dyplomacja publiczna Polski*, “Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska”, sectio K, politologia, vol. 17, 2010, p. 66.

⁴ See: A. Ziętek, *Dyplomacja publiczna jako instrument soft power*, [in:] *Nowe oblicza dyplomacji*, ed. B. Surmacz, Lublin 2013 and J. S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power. Jak osiągnąć sukces w polityce światowej*, Warsaw 2007, pp. 145-146; J.S. Nye, Jr., *Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, “The Annals of the America Academy of Political and Social Science”, vol. 616, 2008, p. 99.

⁵ The aim of *public affairs* is to stay in touch with target groups. In the United States of America, after the integration of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) with the Department of State in 1997, public diplomacy was made separate from *public affairs*. The goal of public diplomacy was promoting American national interest through explaining, dissemination of information and exerting

claims that the notion of “public diplomacy” practically embodies everything that the listed terms bring in individually.⁷ Hence its scope is very broad and it might include three spheres: political, economic, and cultural. In practice, public diplomacy in various countries tends to be limited to one sphere only. For example, in Poland, it is associated mostly with cultural diplomacy or national branding, i.e. creating the image of a country through products or services.⁸

The term “public diplomacy” was coined and first used in 1965 by Edmund Gullion who in his work brings a variety of definitions:

“A typical statement would describe public diplomacy as »direct communication with foreign peoples, with the aim of affecting their thinking and, ultimately, that of their governments« (Malone 1985, 199). [...] Later definitions identified actors and content. Tuch (1990, 3) for example, defined public diplomacy as »a government’s process of communication with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation’s ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and policies«. Frederick (1993, 229) added information about specific content: »activities, directed abroad in the fields of information, education, and culture, whose objective is to influence a foreign government, by influencing its citizens«. [...] Signitzer and Coombs (1992) argued that PR and public diplomacy are very similar because they seek similar objectives and employ similar tools. They defined public diplomacy as »the way in which both government and private individuals and groups influence directly or indirectly those public attitudes and opinions which bear directly on another government’s foreign policy decisions« (p. 138)”.⁹

American Department of State defines public diplomacy as a program sponsored by the government, whose aim is to inform and influence the public opinion in other countries.¹⁰ Previously quoted Joseph Nye defines public diplomacy as “an instrument that governments use to mobilize these [*soft power*] resources to communicate with and attract the publics of other countries, rather than merely their governments.

influence on the foreign recipient. *Public affairs* was to inform the society, media and other institutions about the goals, policies and activities of the government of the United States. See: Ch. Wolf, Jr., B. Rosen, *Public Diplomacy How to Think about and Improve It*, Rand Corp., Santa Monica CA 2004, http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/2004/RAND_OP134.pdf [January 11, 2014].

⁶ Eytan Gilboa (Harvard University, University of Southern California, Bar-Ilan University in Israel, Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies) is one of the best experts on the subject.

⁷ E. Gilboa, *Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy*, “The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science”, vol. 616, 2008, pp. 55-77. See: G. Cowan, N.J. Cull, *Public Diplomacy in a Changing World*, “The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science”, vol. 616, 2008, pp. 6-8, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25097994> [January 11, 2014].

⁸ A. Ziętek, *Dyplomacja publiczna*, p. 67.

⁹ J. Mikułowski Pomorski, *Międzynarodowość jako płaszczyzna komunikacji*, “Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Ekonomicznej w Krakowie”, no. 699, 2006, pp. 5-21.

¹⁰ Ch. Wolf, B. Rosen, *Public Diplomacy*, p. 15, [in:] *Dyplomacja publiczna Polski*, p. 68.

In international politics, the resources that produce soft power arise in large part from the values an organization or country expresses in its culture, in the examples it sets by its internal practices and policies, and in the way it handles its relations with others".¹¹ Another definition of public diplomacy is an attempt at differentiating and distancing it, in its new appearance, from the pejorative connotations of the term "propaganda".¹² Some scholars claim that "propaganda" refers to the activities of totalitarian states (Beata Ocieпка) while more neutral terminology is used in the case of democratic systems: "political advertising, public relations or political communication".¹³ Jerzy J. Wiatr similarly presents the distinction between the two, and states that "propaganda remains to be perceived as a tool of non-democratic governments while public diplomacy has been developed by democracies".¹⁴ The difference is presented in a nutshell by Eytan Gilboa who says that public diplomacy is simply a euphemism for the discredited word "propaganda".¹⁵

As the term *soft power* seems to be absolutely key in the so-called new public diplomacy – as opposed to the "old" public diplomacy – it requires some additional explanation. *Soft power* was coined by Joseph S. Nye and is extensively used in Polish and world literature on the subject.¹⁶ Since his fundamental and authoritative works have been cited incessantly, perhaps a less known source could be brought here, namely the Testimony of Joseph S. Nye, Jr., University Distinguished Service Professor,

¹¹ J. S. Nye, *Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, p. 95.

¹² All the below presented definitions and statements come from the work by M. Kornacka, *Dyplomacja publiczna – dylematy terminologiczne*, [in:] *Nowe oblicza dyplomacji*, ed. B. Surmacz, Lublin 2013, pp. 317-29. In order to differentiate public diplomacy from propaganda, American government circles called upon the statement that public diplomacy is based on facts while propaganda is a combination of facts, half-truths and lies. After: C. Wolf, B. Rosen, *Public Diplomacy*. According to James Grunig, propaganda is a one-way communication, usually based on half-truths, which is to convince the public opinion; after: J. E. Grunig, *Public Relations and International Affairs: Effects, Ethics and Responsibility*, "Journal of International Affairs", vol. 47, 1993, p. 147. According to Ryszard Stemplowski, it is building long-lasting trust that differentiates public diplomacy from propaganda, see: R. Stemplowski, *Wprowadzenie do analizy polityki zagranicznej RP*, Warsaw 2006, p. 200. For some researchers, the differentiating factor are conditions of transmitting communiques. They are of the opinion that at the times of crisis (wars and international tension), the constructed messages need to be included into propaganda measures. See: E. Wolfson, *Dyplomacja publiczna z amerykańskiej perspektywy*, [in:] *Dyplomacja publiczna*, p. 205.

¹³ After M. Kornacka, *Dyplomacja publiczna*, p. 321. B. Ocieпка, *System propagandowy*, [in:] *Teoria i praktyka propagandy*, eds. B. Dobek-Ostrowska, J. Frasz, B. Ocieпка, Wrocław 1999, p. 47.

¹⁴ J. J. Wiatr, *Publiczny wymiar dyplomacji*, "Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny", vol. 3, no. 5(15), 2003, p. 63.

¹⁵ E. Gilboa, *Dyplomacja w epoce informacji*, [in:] *Dyplomacja publiczna*, ed. B. Ocieпка, Wrocław 2008, p. 39.

¹⁶ Among others, in the publications by B. Ocieпка, A. W. Ziętek, M. Kornacka in Poland, and specialists in the USA and throughout the world. It seems nearly impossible to talk about public diplomacy without employing the term of *soft power*.

Harvard University, Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives. J. S. Nye in his testimony before the US Congress titled *Restoring America's Reputation in the World and Why It Matters*¹⁷ stated among others:

“I developed the concept of soft power in 1989 while writing a book that questioned the conventional wisdom about American decline. After examining American economic and military power, I found that something was still missing – the ability of the United States to attract others and thus increase the probability of obtaining the outcomes we wanted. It has been interesting to see an academic concept migrate to the front pages of newspapers, and to see it used by top leaders in China, India, Indonesia, Europe, and elsewhere over the past two decades. But wide usage has sometimes meant misuse of the concept as a synonym for anything other than military force. Properly defined, *soft power* is the ability to affect others to obtain preferred outcomes by the co-optive means of framing the agenda, persuasion and positive attraction. [...] My remarks are drawn from my forthcoming book on smart power”.¹⁸

Later on in his presentation, J. S. Nye describes how *soft power* works, claiming that there exist two basic models of its application: a direct and indirect one. “In the direct form, leaders may be attracted and persuaded by the benignity, competence or charisma of other leaders. Friendships sometimes matter in world politics, and elite networks often play an important role. More common, however, is a two-step model in which publics and third parties are influenced, and they in turn affect the leaders of other countries. In this case, *soft power* has an important indirect effect by creating an enabling environment. Alternatively, if an actor or action is perceived as repulsive, it creates a disabling environment”.

J. S. Nye states that evaluating the results, or even measuring the effectiveness of the process, is extremely difficult and costly, and that it applies to both the first and the second model. It is due to the length of certain actions which may last over a period of many years, as well as causality of various contributing factors which may have resulted in bringing the originally intended effects. Obviously, the situation is usually made even more complicated by the perennial budget shortages allocated to public diplomacy.

To illustrate the results of the one-step model, J. S. Nye brings the examples of student exchanges and visits to the US political decision makers: “Forty six current and 165 former heads of government are products of US higher education. Not all of the nearly 700,000 foreign students who come to the US annually are attracted to the country, but the large majority are. Research has consistently shown that exchange students return home with a more positive view of the country in which they studied and the people with whom they interacted”.¹⁹

¹⁷ J. S. Nye, Jr., *Restoring America's Reputation in the World and Why It Matters. Testimony before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., March 4, 2010*. John Brown's Notes and Essays, <http://johnbrownnotesandessays.blogspot.com/2010/03/testimony-of-joseph-s-nye-jr-restoring.html> [March 22, 2013].

¹⁸ Ibidem.

¹⁹ Ibidem.

As no claim seems to be sufficient without a good example supporting it, J. S. Nye makes a reference to the end of the Cold War and specifically to the First Secretary Gorbachev's *perestroika* and *glasnost* which may have been inspired by the ideas learnt by Alexander Yakovlev²⁰ during his student stay in the United States.

“With the two step model, public opinion affects elites by creating an enabling or disabling environment for specific policy initiatives. For example, in regard to Iraq in 2003, Turkish officials were constrained by public and parliamentary opinion and unable to allow the American 4th Infantry Division to cross their country. The Bush Administration's lack of soft power hurt its hard power. Similarly, Mexican President Vicente Fox wished to accommodate his friend George W. Bush by supporting a second UN resolution authorizing invasion, but was constrained by Mexican public opinion. When being pro-American is a political kiss of death, public opinion has an effect on policy that the skeptics' simple proposition does not capture”.²¹

According to J. S. Nye, even military analysts – and the term “military” definitely signifies the employment of *hard power* rather than its soft variety – seem to understand and appreciate the necessity of resorting to *soft power*. General Petraeus²² repeatedly warned against employing temporary measures which in a longer term might ruin the reputation of the United States. “We end up paying a price for it ultimately. Abu Ghraib²³ and other situations like that are non-biodegradable. They don't go away. The enemy continues to beat you with them like a stick”.²⁴

Reiterating his points, J. S. Nye concluded the testimony before the US Congress in the following way: “The conversion of power resources into preferred outcomes always depends upon particular contexts. A strong tank army is likely to prevail if a battle is fought in a desert, but not if it is fought in a swamp. The soft power of attraction and persuasion can create enabling or disabling environments that affect the probabilities of obtaining favorable outcomes, but human power relations, unlike the laws of classical physics, are probabilistic rather than deterministic. Does soft power matter? Yes. Does it always predict the outcome? No. Are we better off with it than without it? Surely. That is why a smart power strategy combines hard and soft power resources”.²⁵

Americans started paying tremendous attention to the idea of *smart power* after the experiences of the two wars, Iraq and Afghanistan, which proved that the previously

²⁰ Alexander Yakovlev was a Soviet politician and historian. During the 1980s he was the chief of party ideology and was considered to be the intellectual force behind Mikhail Gorbachev's reform program. In 2005, President of Poland, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, awarded him with the Order of Merit of the Republic of Poland.

²¹ J. S. Nye, *Restoring America's Reputation*.

²² David Howell Petraeus is a retired American military (four-star general) and public official (Director of CIA). Until November 2012, Petraeus commanded the coalition forces in Iraq.

²³ The US Army personnel and Central Intelligence Agency committed a series of documented human rights violations against detainees in the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq.

²⁴ J. S. Nye, *Restoring America's Reputation*.

²⁵ *Ibidem*.

conducted American foreign policy was flawed and required decisive actions in order to improve it.²⁶ It is exactly public diplomacy that was to be anointed as a panacea for problems of this sort but strangely enough the job was to be done not exclusively by it. The best results are perceived to be gained when a combination of *hard power* and *soft power* is applied, functioning under the name of *smart power* which is to cure all the ailments of the foreign policy of this country. It goes without saying that such a possibility is not available to all countries – no matter how much they would desire it – because the use of this strategy and the very application of *smart power* obviously requires of a given country to possess the category of *hard power*, translated into real, technologically advanced and sizable military which, naturally, immediately rules out quite a number of states.

Joseph S. Nye, the “founding father” of the notions of *soft power* and *smart power*, admits that it is very difficult to assess any action or attempt from the field of public diplomacy as a direct reason for a given consequence which begs a question whether the effects of this diplomacy are measurable and verifiable at all?

The way of assessing results accomplished by public diplomacy should be measured against the goals of public diplomacy of a given country, providing they are clearly defined. Should public diplomacy be mainly geared towards nation branding, assessment of its undertakings will differ depending on a country. In some states, public diplomacy is to serve and support the goals of own foreign policy, while in others it is a goal in itself and not only a means leading to the goal, for example building mutual trust. Therefore, some countries use public diplomacy to attain one or more goals, or all goals attainable.

It is quite a common practice that in evaluation processes only a given program or project is being assessed mainly because no one knows how to assess anything else. Firstly, it has been done this way for a long time as many government programs have existed and been run for a number of years now. Secondly, because such programs have substantial history behind them, there exist data bases which allow for comparisons in evaluating processes. And thirdly, since a given program had been approved and moneys allocated to it, their recipient must prove that the funds have been used appropriately and in accordance with the binding regulations – without the necessity of proving the unmeasurable results – which fulfills the basic requirements of sound financial management. Hence, it seems that the evaluation process of a given project – in order to receive the desired funding – is actually decided upon at its very preliminary stage, i.e. the stage of planning. When we consider that not every program is entirely transparent, the situation becomes even more complex.

For obvious reasons, long-term projects are most difficult to assess as their expected results are not necessarily to bring a happy end to a given process but their aim is to cause a change in people’s attitudes. A good example of such an activity is creating a favorable image of a given country, or causing changes in the perception of a given state, which undoubtedly is a long-term and a very expensive process requiring

²⁶ E. J. Wilson, III, *Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power*, “The Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science”, vol. 616, 2008, p. 110.

cohesion and a great deal of patience both on the part of those actually implementing certain actions and those responsible for assigning the funds to them. A much easier life seems to be enjoyed by short-term projects with quickly observable, or not, results.²⁷

Robert Banks, in his previously referred to work on evaluating public diplomacy, lists several interesting examples of attempts made at assessing the results of public diplomacy actions in the United States. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), during the term in the office of President Bush, Jr., constructed an evaluation process called Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART). OMB decided to analyze four basic components of any given program within the field of public diplomacy, namely Purpose and Design, Strategic Planning, Program Management and Results. Once every component has been examined and evaluated, a given program received “grades”. After examining and assessing each component, the program was then assigned a score within the following range: “Effective”, “Moderately Effective”, “Adequate” or “Ineffective”. A rating of “Results not Demonstrated” meant that the OMB could not determine program success because there was no usable baseline data or the performance measures in use were inadequate. The OMB “PARTed” nearly 1,000 USG programs from 2004-2008 and the results, including those for PD, were posted on its www.expectmore.gov website.²⁸ Even though the evaluation program was shut down during President Obama’s administration,²⁹ according to R. Banks it has substantially contributed to the assessment process.

The terminological confusion regarding the notion of “public diplomacy” is further compounded by the fact that it appears in at least two forms: public diplomacy and new public diplomacy. Public diplomacy is a construct which grew out of traditional diplomacy and its newer form called new public diplomacy is basically connected and brought about by time-related dividing line to differentiate it from the “old” one. New public diplomacy dates to the end of the Cold War. It seems that the fundamental difference between the “old” and the “new” is that the former was based on the monolog (bordering at times on political and cultural imperialism) while the latter is to utilize the dialog and the dialog only.

As put by Professor Bruce Gregory,³⁰ modern public diplomacy – called quite differently then – found its beginnings in the modern era at least at the time of V. Lenin and W. Wilson. World War I served as a platform for the study of building and managing relationships through cultural diplomacy. “The horrors of modern warfare and a deep desire to prevent future wars contributed to widespread interest in fostering global

²⁷ Based on: R. Banks, *A Resource Guide to Public Diplomacy Evaluation*, “CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy”, Los Angeles CA 2011, pp. 7-39.

²⁸ Much emphasis is put on declassifying documents and full transparency of government actions.

²⁹ R. Banks previously called attention to the sweeping changes in the government and the apparent lack of continuity in long-term undertakings.

³⁰ Bruce Gregory is Director of Public Diplomacy Institute and lectures at George Washington University. He is also member of Council on Foreign Relations Task Force on Public Diplomacy and Public Diplomacy Council. In the years 1985-1998, he was the executive director of U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy.

cultural relations through educational and scientific exchanges. [...] In contrast with the European model of government information and cultural ministries, Americans relied initially on private philanthropic and educational organizations”.³¹

It was only later on that several institutions were established, either sponsored by the American government or simply representing it, usually as result of some sort of external threat, and called to life in connection with a conducted war or its approach or the looming danger, for example: Creel Committee at the time of WWI, the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, the Office of War Information, Voice of America at the time of WWII, U.S. Information Agency (USIA), Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) at the time of the Cold War.³²

According to Professor Nicolas J. Cull,³³ the ability to smartly utilize public diplomacy depends on the appropriate implementation of five basic components indispensable in this field, which he calls the taxonomy of public diplomacy. The components are as follows: 1. Listening, 2. Advocacy, 3. Cultural Diplomacy, 4. Exchange, 5. International Broadcasting.

Historically speaking, it appears that information and its dissemination has always been the most significant aspect of the international media communication, especially when the news was served in an objective manner. Although the beginnings of the modern (in a technological sense) international news service dates only to the 1920s, a government sponsored spreading of information has been with us for many centuries. The case in point can be the example of the Holy Roman Emperor Frederic II (1194-1250) who ordered for the official letter with news about the activities of his court to be distributed in the neighboring capitals. In more contemporary times, the achievements registered by the BBC World Service, international media service has become one of the fundamentals of the British public diplomacy. Such activities are obviously very expensive and agencies falling into the category of *soft power* are much competitive but the results achieved in the sphere of public diplomacy cannot be possibly overestimated.³⁴

Scholars from all over the world claim in unison that that not so much the birth but rather the necessity of the resurrection of public diplomacy dates to the period after September 11, 2001 (following the terrorist attack on the United States) and is also related to the American experiences in Iraq as well as the increase in anti-American sentiment in the world. The role, essence and goals of public diplomacy were subjects of much heated debates in the United States first and then throughout the whole world.

³¹ B. Gregory, *Public Diplomacy: Sunrise of an Academic Field*, “The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science”, vol. 616, 2008, p. 277.

³² Ibidem, p. 279.

³³ Nicholas J. Cull lectures on public diplomacy and heads the public diplomacy program at Annenberg School for Communication/School of International Relations of the University of Southern California. In addition, he authored the book titled *The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: US Propaganda and Public Diplomacy, 1945-89* (Cambridge University Press).

³⁴ Based on: N. J. Cull, *Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories*, “The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science”, vol. 616, 2008, pp. 31-4.

It has been decided that abandoning some activities from the field of public diplomacy after the end of the Cold War proved to be a serious mistake.³⁵ Similarly to the necessity of actions creating the image of a country, public diplomacy also requires continuity and consistence, and maintaining good relations and a favorable image of a country is one more proof of the wisdom of the old adage that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.

In addition, and particularly in the context of today's broad access to information and relatively common transparency of actions, it is crucial that everything happening in the field of public diplomacy be based on good will, the principle of reciprocity (though parity of means and resources is hardly achievable), noble intentions and simply telling the truth. Edward Murrow, Director of the United States Information Agency,³⁶ claimed that diplomacy should be based on trust and credibility, and honesty is in it absolutely indispensable. And as Edward R. Murrow (USIA Director, 1961-1964) said in 1963 before a House Subcommittee regarding U.S. public diplomacy activities: "American traditions and the American ethic require us to be truthful. [...] Truth is the best propaganda and lies are the worst. To be persuasive we must be believable; to be believable we must be credible; to be credible we must be truthful. It is as simple as that".³⁷

As said before, public diplomacy experiences have proved that the public opinion influences the attitudes of the elites, including decision-makers, by creating a favorable or unfavorable environment for specific political initiatives. If we translate this statement into the electorate and votes, it does seem to matter, especially in view of the possible approaching elections. To prove the point, for example, during the military operation conducted by the US in Iraq in 2003, Turkish authorities were not able to allow for the march of the troops of the American 4th Infantry Division across Turkish territory because of the voice of the public opinion and the parliament. Hence the lack of *soft power* on the side of Bush's administration effectively blocked the use of *hard power*. A similar case happened when Mexican President Vincente Fox, befriended to George W. Bush and a close ally, was stopped by the Mexican public opinion from supporting the UN resolution authorizing the invasion on Iraq.

³⁵ Cf.: R. Banks, *A Resource Guide*; U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report, *U.S. Public diplomacy: State Department and Broadcasting Board of Governors Expand Post-9/11 Efforts but Challenges Remain*, GAO-04-1061T, Washington D.C, August 23, 2004, www.gao.gov/products/GAO-04-1061T [February 20, 2014]; K. R. Fitzpatrick, *U.S. Public Diplomacy in a Post-9/11 World: From Messaging to Mutuality*, "CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy", Los Angeles CA 2011; J. Melissen, *Public diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice*, [in:] *The Present and Future of Public Diplomacy. A European Perspective*, ed. J. Noya, 2006 Madrid Conference on Public Diplomacy (Working Paper), Elcano Royal Institute for International and Strategic Studies, November 30, 2006, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/web/rielcano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/Elcano_in/Zonas_in/DT29-2006#.U0UYSIXQvRE [February 20, 2014].

³⁶ Functioning "independently" from 1953 to 1999, and then transferred under the authority of the Department of State.

³⁷ See: W. Laqueur, *Save Public Diplomacy. Broadcasting America's Message Matters*, "Foreign Affairs", vol. 73, no. 5, 1994, [in:] M. Kornacka, *Dyplomacja publiczna*, p. 328.

Actors on the political scene not only try to influence one another in a direct or indirect way through employing *soft power* but also bitterly compete in order to deprive the other side of the craved virtue of attractiveness and credibility by creating an unfavorable environment for the opponent in the perception of the public opinion of own country as well as that of significant third parties. As good example of such an instance could be the allocation by the US Senate of 30 million dollars to document, make public and circulate the cases of human rights violations in Iran. As a reprisal, Iranian parliament created a fund of 20 million dollars to prove human rights violations in the United States. Although it happens sometimes that leaders simply disregard completely the opinion of the third parties, which often times is wrongly called “the world public opinion”, usually their fear of possible diplomatic isolation decisively impacts their actions.

In 2008, after the invasion on Georgia – as claimed by Joseph S. Nye – Russia very carefully controlled its own national media but was unable and unprepared to present its own point of view in the international arena. Georgian President, Mikheil Saakashvili, used his perfectly fluent English to dominate the reports on the developments of the situation all over the world. Russia won militarily but failed to utilize *soft power* to consolidate that victory.

There exists a wide variety of resources from which a smart strategy of *soft power* can draw. The basic sources can involve culture, system of values, reasonable and lawful politics, a positive image of a country, effective economy, competent military and many others. At times, these resources are specially customized to fit the needs of *soft power*, as exemplified by intelligence services, information agencies, diplomacy, public diplomacy, exchange, aid and training programs, and many others. Sceptics claim that even very skillful use of *soft power*, even when strengthened by a great attractiveness of a given country, still does not guarantee the expected or desired effects. If there are ever any guarantees as regards something as difficult to measure, predict or even define, this holds undoubtedly true. Although “ping pong” diplomacy of President Nixon seems to have brought some positive results, it seems rather impossible for *soft power* to convince Kim Jong Un of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to abandon his nuclear ambitions in spite of the efforts and alleged friendship of the former NBA star NBA Denis Rodman. There seem to be too many determinants at play in the case of *soft power* and the results are virtually impossible to predict in spite of best efforts and intentions.

Notwithstanding the reigning terminological chaos, compounded by adding the adjective “new” in the case of public diplomacy, it seems unquestionable that public and cultural diplomacy is a very important component of a state foreign policy. And in spite of newly appearing terms and notions in the countries of historically shaped tradition of searching for a theoretical foundation for their actions in the field of foreign policy, for example the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, public diplomacy is far from reserved exclusively to the diplomatic activities of the listed states.

It appears that nearly all countries from all continents actively engage or try to engage in public diplomacy – apart from the previously mentioned countries, that applies,

for example, to Brazil, China, Iran, Canada, Norway, New Zealand, Australia, Holland – but the special effort is noted in the case of the countries which newly emerged on the map of sovereign states, which also includes Poland.

In the era of globalization, when information is available all over the world within seconds, diplomacy seems to be indispensable in the activities of any country and is of utmost significance. Following Professor Roman Kuźniar's definition one could generally say that diplomacy is an instrument of politics through which a given state expresses and conducts its foreign policy in its external relations.³⁸ It should be added here that the development of international relations has brought many complementary diplomatic instruments, tools or methods which may function independently and/or support the activities of traditional diplomacy.

Public diplomacy is, once again, a very important instrument in foreign policy, which may shape and influence public opinion in other countries, and through it also indirectly impact the government of this country. If we agree that public diplomacy is to support or assist traditional state diplomacy, the major difference between the two is the emphasis of public diplomacy on the public sphere. Therefore, public diplomacy should be transparent and unlike the traditional one may be socialized as it may be conducted by the government as well as non-governmental entities, and its recipient may be both a wide range of groups and very select ones.

When analyzing the historical development of terminology and the changes from the “ministry of war” to “ministry of defense”, “department of propaganda” to “department of information” and then into “department of public diplomacy”, as common in many countries, it seems that the new public diplomacy is just a label and a more attractive, politically correct wrapping covering similar if not exactly the same content. Semantics may differ and times call for the always necessary terms to denote a new approach, but the goals and tasks stay very close to those of the past, regardless whether we use the much disgraced term “propaganda”. The only novel phenomena are desired transparency, if it is ever achievable, and engagement of non-governmental actors. So actors change and so do the means of disseminating information together with access to it, but the goal remains the very same in spite of applying a different theoretical approach and implementation of a new rhetoric or new tools, regardless whether we discuss *soft power*, *hard power* or the combination of the two called *smart power*.

It seems there is very little doubt that although public diplomacy is a significant element of the foreign policy of a given country, it remains only a small cog in the machinery called diplomacy and is at service of the latter. And just as public diplomacy constitutes only a part of overall diplomacy, cultural diplomacy is or can be a subsection of public diplomacy. This seemingly innocuous part of diplomacy can be extremely important in international relations. This sphere is very attractive to the recipient, tends to represent the best a foreign country can offer, undoubtedly can have far-reaching effects and should be in reality perceived as potentially very impactful in terms of international audience. If we reject the attitude of cultural superiority or cultural

³⁸ R. Kuźniar, *Międzynarodowe stosunki polityczne*, [in:] *Stosunki międzynarodowe: geneza, struktura, dynamika*, eds. E. Haliżak, R. Kuźniar, Warsaw 2001, p. 120.

imperialism, and play the cultural card just right, the results can be astounding and far from insignificant. After all, whether it is culture or any sort of international exchange, the goals stay the same as in public diplomacy, i.e. supporting the interests of a given country and/or promoting it, and in essence it is advocating for own country and creating a positive image of it with the prospects of further potential political, economic and other gains.

The concept has been known and tried for centuries; although today's cultural diplomacy is much different from that of the past but the divergence applies to the means, tools and actors engaged in it while the goal remains the same. Contemporary problems are much more complex than before and they usually involve many countries or groups. Moreover, the scene is much richer in terms of actors appearing on it, be it governmental, quasi-governmental or non-governmental at all, although sometimes it is very hard to tell the allegiance. Communicating has become much faster and easier and matters of national and international importance are at time hard to tell apart as they are so intertwined. The new actors on the scene are for example ministries and agencies specializing in matters of science, education, and culture. However, leaving aside the label, they all invariably function to bring financial profits to their own country and in the case of culture, they also serve as an integral part of the state's identity. Therefore, especially cultural diplomacy, part of public diplomacy, appears to be an increasingly significant and much useful part of overall diplomacy and foreign policy of a state.

Should one agree that one of the main tasks of public diplomacy is promoting understanding and advancing interests of a given country as a complementary measure to traditional diplomacy, **the only added value today, based on historical comparison, seems to be the requirement of some sort of benefit to be registered by the two or all sides involved, while the range of those benefits and the necessity of parity are only secondary side issues.**

Резюме

ПУБЛИЧНАЯ ДИПЛОМАТИЯ И ЕЕ СОВРЕМЕННАЯ ПРАКТИКА

Публичная дипломатия исходит от традиционной дипломатии и является важнейшим инструментом внешней политики, который позволяет оказывать влияние на публичное мнение в других государствах и через него, посредственно, на их правительства. Перенос акцентов от традиционной дипломатии на публичную сферу является результатом ее эффективности, в силу того, что она оказывает поддержку традиционной дипломатической деятельности. Отличительной чертой публичной дипломатии является ее прозрачность и общественный характер. Ее может осуществлять как правительство, так и неправительственные субъекты, а реципиентом являться как широкая, так и узкоспециализированная группа. Ее целью является создание или поддержание позитивного имиджа страны или общества за границей, формирование позитивного отношения к автору.

Если предположить, что среди основных целей публичной дипломатии можно перечислить продвижение взаимопонимания, выражение культурного суверенитета, промоция национального суверенитета и своего рода дополнение традиционной дипломатии, то ее **единственной добавленной стоимостью в современном мире, в сравнении с историческим опытом, является необходимость того, чтобы обе или все участвующие стороны получили выгоду. При этом спектр этой выгоды или требование паритета является второстепенным вопросом.**

Ключевые слова: публичная дипломатия

Streszczenie

DYPLMACJA PUBLICZNA I JEJ WSPÓŁCZESNA PRAKTYKA

Dyplomacja publiczna wywodzi się z dyplomacji tradycyjnej i jest bardzo ważnym instrumentem w polityce zagranicznej, dzięki któremu można wpływać na opinię publiczną w innych państwach, a pośrednio przez nią na ich rządy. Przeniesienie akcentów z dyplomacji tradycyjnej (państwowej) na sferę publiczną jest warunkowane względami użyteczności dyplomacji publicznej, która wspiera tradycyjne działania dyplomatyczne. Cechą wyróżniającą dyplomację publiczną ma być transparentność i jej uspołecznienie. Może być ona prowadzona zarówno przez rząd, jak i podmioty pozarządowe, odbiorcą zaś może być zarówno szeroka, jak również wyselekcjonowana grupa. Jej celem jest kształtowanie lub wspieranie pozytywnego wizerunku kraju, społeczeństwa za granicą, kształtowanie pozytywnych postaw wobec nadawcy.

Obserwując historyczny rozwój nazewnictwa i zmiany „ministerstwa wojny” na „ministerstwo obrony”, „departamentu propagandy” na „departament informacji”, a następnie na „departament dyplomacji publicznej”, w ocenie autora nowa dyplomacja publiczna to rodzaj nowszego, bardziej atrakcyjnego opakowania, ale w istocie o bardzo podobnej zawartości. To tylko wymóg czasów i czysta semantyka, cele i zadania bowiem niewiele się różnią od czasów minionych i to bez względu, czy użyje się tu skompromitowanego słowa propaganda, czy też nie. Zmieniają się aktorzy, adresaci przekazu, zmienia się dostęp do informacji i środki jej przekazywania, ale cel pozostaje ten sam, pomimo zastosowanego podłoża teoretycznego czy wykorzystanej retoryki, bądź zastosowanych narzędzi – i to bez względu, czy mamy do czynienia z *soft power*, *hard power* czy kombinacją obu zwaną *smart power*.

Jeśli przyjąć, że zasadne jest określenie głównych celów dyplomacji publicznej jako promocję zrozumienia, wyrażenie suwerenności kulturowej, promocję narodowych interesów i swoiste dopełnienie dyplomacji tradycyjnej, to **jedyną wartością dodaną w czasach współczesnych w porównaniu z historią zdaje się być wymóg konieczności odniesienia korzyści przez obie bądź wszystkie współpracujące ze sobą strony, przy czym zakres tych korzyści czy ich wymóg parytetu pozostaje już tylko kwestią uboczną.**

Słowa kluczowe: dyplomacja publiczna

Keywords: public diplomacy

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